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Our policy of forbidding the execution of cognovit notes can be sufficiently
realized by the invalidation solely of the cognovit feature. Although the
Supreme Court through circumvention has reached a very desirable interpre-
tation, it might be advisable for the legislature to make our statutes analogous
to those which invalidate only the warranty of attorney to confess judgment
without service of process, and which thus leave the note itself enforceable by
the customary methods of procedure. This would tend to secure uniformity in
interstate commercial transactions,1 2 and to settle moot questions not yet de-
cided such as what might be the result if the original contract provided for the
giving of cognovit notes, or if the mortgage also contained a cognovit clause.1 3
H. J. B.
SURETYSHIP-SUBROGATION-EFFECT OF RELEASE OF SURETY AFTER PARTIAL
SATIFAcoN-Plaintiff and the Bank entered into an agreement with relation to
the preferred stock of the Realty Company by which the Bank purchased the
stock as trustee and the plaintiff guaranteed the payment of dividends as well
as redemption of the stock as provided by the stock agreement. Later, in order
to raise money for repairs, a reorganization of the Realty Company was
affected. As part of the reorganization plan plaintiff was released from all
further liability on his guaranty. He had already paid $15,000 to the com-
pany to be used in payment of dividends and in retirement of the stock. When
the Realty Company went into the hands of a receiver, plaintiff filed a claim
for the money advanced, claiming to be subrogated to the rights of the pre-
ferred stockholders whose stock had been retired with the money advanced.
Held: plaintiff was not entitled to the preference which the stockholders had on
dissolution.1
The first question arising involves the effect of the contract of guaranty in
the first instance. On this point it is generally held that such contracts of
guaranty are valid and can be enforced with the limitation that the guaranty
must be by a third person 2 and not by the corporation itself. 3 If the guaranty
is made by the corporation itself, it is denied effect; for it is contrary to
public policy for a corporation to pay dividends except out of earnings, and a
12"The Cognovit Note Act," by G. A. Farabaugh and Walter Arnold,
5 Indiana L. J1. 93; "The Indiana Cognovit Note Statute," by Bernard C.
Gavit, 5 Indiana L. J1. 208.
13 In Phend v. Midwest Engineering Co., the court merely said, "There is
no stipulation in the conditional-sales contract that the several promissory notes
were to contain the usual terms and conditions of a cognovit or judgment note."
In the principal case the court said, "There is no stipulation in the mortgage
that the note given as evidence of the debt should contain the cognovit feature."
I Ellis v. Thompson (1937), 8 N. E. (2d) 430, Indiana Appellate Court.2 Austin v. Wright (1930), 156 Wash. 24, 286 P. 48; McCampbell v. Obear
(1915), 27 Cal. App. 97, 148 P. 942; Scholbe v. Schuchardt (1920), 292 Ill.
529, 127 N. E. 169; Hornor v. McDonald (1899), 52 La. Ann. 396, 27 So. 91;
Rogers v. Burr (1898), 105 Ga. 432, 31 S. E. 438.
3 In some cases a guaranty by the corporation is construed, not as being
void, but merely to mean that the dividends are cumulative; Prouty v. Michigan
Southern Ry. Co. (1874), 1 Hun. (N. Y.) 655; Boardman v. Lake Shore Ry.
Co. (1881), 84 N. Y. 157; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne (1875), 31 Mich. 76.
RECENT CAlSE NOTES
guaranty of payment is held to be in conflict with the same policy4 . There-
fore, plaintiff was bound on an enforceable contract. Since, at the time of plain-
tiff's release, the preferred stockholders, whose shares had not been retired.
were parties to the release, plaintiff's liability on the guaranty ceased.
This, then, presents the principal problem involved: that is, the right of the
surety to be subrogated to the rights of the preferred stockholders whose stock
was retired and cancelled with the money furnished by the plaintiff. This prob-
lem can best be set forth by indicating the effects of the ruling requested by
the plaintiff. If subrogation were granted, the surety would be put in position
to claim on parity with the holders of the preferred stock whose shares had
not been retired. This would have a double significance; for the holders of such
stock would receive less on their claims; and plaintiff would receive a per-
centage of the remaining assets comparable to that of the stockholders rather
than sustain a complete loss, inasmuch as the assets were insufficient even to
pay the stockholders alone. This result gives rise to the incidental question
of whether, as a matter of policy, plaintiff should be entitled to this preferential
treatment, especially in view of the fact that the policy of the law in case
of business failures is to treat claimants on an equal basis. In addition, the
courts have generally been very partial towards an uncompensated surety; 5
however, on the other hand, they have been strict in denying favorable treat-
ment to a compensated surety. 6 In this case plaintiff is hardly entitled to claim
a position as a "favorite of the law" 7 even though he received no premium for
making the guaranty; for, since he was the owner of practically all of the
common stock, the floatation of the preferred stock issue was beneficial to him
inasmuch as additional capital was placed at his disposal. It follows, then, that
the conventional idea of justice requires no indulgence in favor of the plaintiff.
Since the policy of the law odi the subject of subrogation hardly justifies a
ruling in favor of the plaintiff, it remains to be considered whether adherence to
the settled rules of law would necessitate a decision for the claimant. In this
respect, the court correctly states the dominant rule of law; that is, the right
to subrogation does not arise until the surety has paid the debt in full, or until
4 In the case of Walters' Palm Toffee, Ltd. v. Walters (1933), Ch. Div.
321, where plaintiff guaranteed payment of dividends and the corporation
agreed to repay him on demand, the court held the agreement to be void as
contrary to the public policy mentioned. Other cases so holding are: Austin v.
Wright (1930), 156 Wash. 24, 286 P. 48; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne (1875),
31 Mich. 76.
5 State v. Medary (1848), 17 Ohio 565; Birdsall v. Hedcock (1877), 32 Ohio
St. 177; Anderson v. Bellenger (1889), 87 Ala. 334, 6 So. 82; Merchants Nat.
Bank v. Cole (1910), 83 Ohio 50, 93 N. E. 465. In all of these cases the con-
tract was construed in a manner more favorable to the surety than the lan-
guage justified.
6 In the case of People of the City of Detroit v. Blue Ribbon Auto Drivers'
Assn. (1931), 254 Mich. 263, 237 N. W. 261, the court makes the following
statement: "Bonds of sureties for hire are more strictly construed against them
than are bonds against gratuitous sureties." The following cases make similar
distinctions in the treatment of the two types of sureties: Rose v. Rann (i931),
254 Mich. 259, 237 S. W. 60; Grinnell Realty Co. v. Surety Co. (1931), 253
Mich. 16, 234 N. W. 125.
7 Kingsbury v. Westfall (1875), 61 N. Y. 356; Wright v. Johnson (1832), 8
Wend. 512, 11 N. Y. Com. Law Rep. 509.
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the creditor is otherwise entirely satisfied.8 Adherence to this rule requires
full satisfaction of the claim before subrogation can be granted; though it is
immaterial to what extent the surety is forced to 'contribute to the satisfaction.9
In other words, subrogation will not be granted where it will prejudice the
claim of the creditor who had the surety's assurance of payment.1 0 It is sub-
bitted that this policy of not allowing the surety to act in a manner detrimental
to the interests of the assured creditor should be the determinating factor in the
present case, and that the release should not be permitted to have the effect
of putting the released surety in the position to affect injuriously the releasing
creditor.1 1 Therefore, it appears that the court was correct in denying the
right of subrogation to the released surety until the entire claim which he
guaranteed was satisfied. R. E. M.
CONFLICT OF LAws-QUALiFICATION-The Burns Mortgage Company brings
an action on a promissory note, dated October 10, 1925, given by the
defendant Hardy in the state of Florida, and so executed under the laws of
that state to constitute a sealed instrument. Under the law of New Hampshire,
the state in which the action is brought, the instrument is not a contract under
seal. Section 3 of the New Hampshire statute of limitations provides that
personal actions shall be brought within six years after the cause of action
has accrued. The following section provides for a twenty-year period in which
to bring actions on contracts under seal. Defendant demurs on the ground that
the action is barred by Section 3 of the statute. HELD: Statutes of limitation
are local in character, and the statute of the forum, not that of the place of
contracting, governs. The note in suit, being a simple contract, and not a
specialty, falls under the six-year limitation provided by the New Hampshire
statute, and therefore action is barred in this jurisdiction. 1
The court determined that the New Hampshire statute of limitations should
apply to the action, as the lex fori governs in matters local in character.2 For
purposes of this discussion, that much of the decision will be assumed to be
8 Washington Township Board v. American Surety Co. (1932), 97 Ind. App.
45, 183 N. E. 492; Bank of Fayetteville v. Lorwein (1905), 76 Ark. 245, 88
S. W. 919; Knaffi v. Knoxville Bank & Trust Co. (1916), 133 Tenn. 655, 182
S. W. 232.
9 A partial payment of the debt even though it may be the full amount for
which the surety is bound does not give rise to a right of subrogation. Washing-
ton Township Board v. American Surety Co. (1932), 97 Ind. App. 45, 183 N. E.
492; United States v. National Surety Co. (1920), 254 U. S. 73, 41 S. Ct. 29;
McGrath v. Carnegie Trust Co. (1917), 221 N. Y. 92, 116 N. E. 787; Rice v.
Morris (1882), 82 Ind. 204.
lOBrowder & Co. v. Hill (1905), 69 C. C. A. 499, 136 F. 821; Bank of
Fayetteville v. Lorwein (1905), 76 Ark. 245, 88 S. W. 919.
11 In the case of Walters' Palm Toffee, Ltd. v. Walters (1933), Ch. Div.
321, the court said that plaintiff who had guaranteed payment of dividends
could be subrogated to the claim of the preferred stockholders who were paid
with his money. In this case, however, the preferred stockholders would not be
prejudiced; for there appeared to be sufficient earnings to pay the dividend
claim in full. Moreover, the statement was dicta.
1 Burns Mortgage Company, Inc., v. Hardy (District Court, D. New Hamp-
shire, 1937), 19 F. Supp. 287.
2 5 R. C. L. Sec. 197, p. 11.
